Introduction.
For the definitions of propositional calculi, models and the finite model property (f.m.p.) we refer to [l] (we use 'model' for 'strong model').
In this note we describe two equivalent propositional calculi (equivalent in that they have identical sets of theorems) which differ in that one has the f.m.p. and the other does not, and in fact has no nontrivial finite model at all. This shows the f.m.p. is an attribute of a propositional calculus and not of the equivalence class of the calculus, unlike, for instance, decidability.
I should like to thank R. Harrop for conversations on the topics of this paper, and also thank the referee for suggesting considerable improvements.
A propositional calculus without the f.m.p. Consider the propositional calculus P which has the single binary connective-», modus ponens with respect to ->, and axiom schemes
where X, Y and Z stand for arbitrary formulae and IX is an abbreviation for X-+X, PX for 7(7A), etc. Necessity follows by induction on the length of proof of a theorem of P. A theorem with a proof of length one is an instance of an axiom scheme and is of form (i). A theorem B, with longer proof, if it is not of form (i) follows by modus ponens from two theorems A, A^>B, each of shorter proof than B, and so by the induction hypothesis satisfying (i) or (ii).
If A-+B is an instance of I, then A =75 and B is of form (i) or (ii) because A is. By inspection no instance of (PX->X), where k 2:1, can be of form (i) or (ii), and so A->B cannot be an instance of axiom scheme II or of form (ii). Thus A-*B is an instance of axiom scheme III, and A an instance of (IX->Y)->X. Hence A cannot be a substituted case of axiom schemes I or III, which are specially designed to avoid this, and so, being of form (i) or (ii), must be an instance of a scheme
where k^l, and immediately we see that B must be of form (ii). A corollary of this lemma is that P is consistent, that is not every formula is a theorem, and also that P is decidable. Proof. We adapt a technique from [l ] . Let the model have a set E of elements, and a set DEE of designated elements. D^E since the model is nontrivial. We note the following properties. If a, bEE and a, (a-+b)ED, then bED because the model satisfies modus ponens. Also (Pa->a), where \^k<n, is undesignated for all aEE, for if (Pa->a)ED for any aEE, we could choose a nondesignated bEE, and ((Pa->a)-^b) would be undesignated, contradicting the validity of the scheme Ak. Proof. Any model of P must satisfy modus ponens and make the scheme (PX->X)->Y valid for every k>l, since any such instance is a theorem by Lemma 1. But then, from Lemma 2, the model needs an infinite set of designated elements.
Decidable propositional calculi with no finite models have previously been exhibited by R. Harrop (see, for example, [l]).
We remark in passing that the existence of a consistent propositional calculus with no nontrivial finite model can be deduced from the fact that there is no effective test to determine of an arbitrary propositional calculus whether or not it is consistent (see [2]); since no inconsistent calculus has a nontrivial model and if a finite nontrivial model exists for a calculus it can be effectively found.
A propositional calculus with the f.m.p. equivalent to F. Let F* be a propositional calculus with the same axiom schemes as P, but with the single rule
The conclusion of this rule is the same as the conclusion of modus ponens with (IX->Y)->X first premise, and axiom scheme III second premise. A similar proof to that of Lemma 1 establishes that the theorems of F* are just those formulae satisfying (i) or (ii), so that F and F* are equivalent.
Theorem 2. F* has the finite model property.
Proof. Define the length of a formula to be the number of symbols (parentheses, propositional variables and connectives) of which it consists.
Let/be a formula of F* which is not a theorem, and let \sx, • ■ ■ ,sn] be the finite set of all formulae constructable from the propositional variables of/and of length less than or equal to the length of/. This is a model of P*, for firstly the axiom schemes are valid; if elements of 1, Sx, ■ ■ ■ , sn are substituted into the axiom schemes the result is either 1 or a provable member of slt • • ■ , sn. Secondly, the rule preserves designation. If the conclusion is not designated, it is a nonprovable one of Si, • • • , sn, but then the premise, containing the same propositional variables as the conclusion and of shorter length, is a member of Si, ■ • • , sn. It cannot be a theorem (otherwise the conclusion would be) and so is not designated.
Finally/ is rejected in this model by the identity substitution for /G {si, • • • , sn} and is not provable.
